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Abstract
During the 20th Century (especially since the end of the 1940s), many national 
constitutions, international documents and human rights treaties explicitly recog-
nized a so-called right of access to justice, in various degrees of scope and coverage. 
And yet, the concrete articulation of the basic principles that should govern the ef-
fective allocation of the right of access to justice has proved difficult and uncertain. 
Constitutional courts on one side, national legislators and political activists on the 
other, have often stumbled on difficult problems. This paper argues that a capa-
bilities approach (CA, for short) has much to say in guiding the difficult political 
questions that lurk behind judicial, political and social interventions in the field. 
In a nutshell, the argument is this: we are well advised to interpret the provision of 
equal access to justice as an instrument for the protection of people’s capabilities, 
both within as well as beyond the legal process itself. When the need for tragic 
choices in prioritizing litigants or classes of cases arises, we are well advised to use 
two conceptual tools recently elaborated within a CA, and allocate, for example, 
the right to legal aid for a particular class of litigants or areas of law in light of its 
fertility in promoting the parties substantive achievements both within and beyond 
the legal process itself, or the corrosiveness of the disadvantages caused by not pro-
viding it. The paper has four sections. The first section provides a short introduction 
to a CA, presenting its vocabulary and speculating on its reach in guiding practical 
thought in the field of access to justice. The second section closely comments on the 
decisions by the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights that 
provide the general framework of constitutional protections for indigent parties in 
the US and in Europe. The third section introduces two observation-concepts that 
have been recently developed within a CA, and that might prove especially useful 
in the field of access to justice and, in particular, for allocating the right to legal aid 
to indigent parties —namely, the concepts of «fertile capability» and «corrosive 
disadvantage». The fourth section concludes.
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1. Introduction
during the 20th Century (especially since the end of the 1940s), many na-
tional constitutions, international documents and human rights treaties explicitly 
recognized a so-called right of access to justice, in various degrees of scope and 
coverage. «The project of the twentieth century» —in Curtis and Resnik’s happy, 
albeit rather pessimistic, phrasing— «was getting people into courts. The ques-
tion for the twenty-first is what to do with all who became eligible to enter» 1.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains the most general and 
common formulation of the right of access to justice, and speaks of a right to 
a fair trial and a right to an effective remedy. Beyond this common core, world 
constitutions display much variance. For example, the US Constitution originally 
recognized a mere right to retain one’s counsel in criminal proceedings, but it 
is now standardly read to provide a categorical right to a publicly paid licensed 
attorney in criminal proceedings, and a conditional right to legal aid in all other 
proceedings.
Some constitutions provide (at least on paper) broader protections, however. 
For example, European law contains some of the most protective formulations 
of the right of access to justice. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union recognizes to everyone the right to an effective remedy 
and a fair trial, for all violations of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Union. Crucially, such right includes both a right to «a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously 
established by law» (art. 47,2) as well as (art. 47,3) a right to legal aid, which shall 
be made «available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is 
necessary to ensure effective access to justice». And, beginning with the famous 
Golder case (in 1975), the European Court of Human Rights consolidated the 
interpretation of the right of access to justice as one of the fundamental guaran-
tees of the right to a fair trial recognized in article 6 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights.
World-wide institutional recognitions and international political attention on 
access to justice should come as no surprise —in most accounts, the concrete 
realization of access to justice is strictly connected with the entrenchment of the 
rule of law, the protection of democratic values in public decision making, and it 
is seen as a key instrument in the realization of social justice, through law.
And yet, the concrete articulation of the basic principles that should govern 
the effective allocation of the right of access to justice has proved difficult and 
uncertain. Constitutional courts on one side, national legislators and political 
activists on the other, have often stumbled on the following problems: deter-
mining the significance of the distinction between criminal and non-criminal 
proceedings (and, thus, extending the protection of a categorical right to legal 
aid very commonly offered in the former, to the latter as well); determining the 
significance of the distinction between initiating a claim, and resisting to one 
1 Curtis and Resnik, 2011: 306.
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initiated by others, for the allocation of the right to access to courts; finding ef-
fective and suitable alternatives to the provision of free legal aid, and a rationale 
for distinguishing among cases; comparing the costs and benefits of legal activ-
ism in formal courts, and political or social activism more generally, within larger 
processes of social reform and transformations.
This essay critically discusses some of these problems and few others and, 
while it offers no definitive resolution to any of them, finds that a capabilities 
approach (CA, for short) has much to say in guiding the difficult political ques-
tions that lurk behind judicial, political and social interventions in the field 2. In 
a nutshell, the argument is this: we are well advised to interpret the provision of 
equal access to justice as an instrument for the protection of people’s capabilities, 
both within as well as beyond the legal process itself. When the need for tragic 
choices in prioritizing litigants or classes of cases arises, we are well advised to 
use two conceptual tools recently elaborated within a CA, and allocate, for ex-
ample, the right to legal aid for a particular class of litigants or areas of law in 
light of its fertility in promoting the parties substantive achievements both within 
and beyond the legal process itself, or the corrosiveness of the disadvantages 
caused by not providing it.
The paper has four sections. The first section provides a short introduction 
to a CA, presenting its vocabulary and speculating on its reach in guiding prac-
tical thought in the field of access to justice. The second section closely com-
ments on the decisions by the US Supreme Court and the European Court of 
Human Rights that provide the general framework of constitutional protections 
for indigent parties in the US and in Europe. The third section introduces two 
observation-concepts that have been recently developed within a CA, and that 
might prove especially useful in the field of access to justice and, in particular, 
for allocating the right to legal aid to indigent parties —namely, the concepts of 
fertile capability and corrosive disadvantage. The fourth section concludes.
2.  On the Possible Uses of a CA in Interpreting the Right of Access  
to Justice
Any theory of social justice must choose (while giving sound justifications 
for the choice made) a specific currency, or (using a CA’s distinctive language) 
a space or informational focus, for judging relative or absolute advantages and 
disadvantages within the relevant population under observation 3. In this sense, 
when stated in its most general (and, perhaps, least ambitious) form, a CA choos-
es a particular currency (or, again, a particular informational focus, or space) 
in well-defined exercises of social evaluation. define one’s achievements (or 
functionings, in the CA’s technical language) as the actual realizations of one’s 
2 On the CA in general, see Sen, 2009, 2003, 1999, 1980; Nussbaum, 2007, 2006, 2003, 2000; An-
derson, 2010, 1999; Alkire, 2002; Crocker, 2008; pogge, 2002; Robeyns, 2005. For an early application 
of a CA in the field of access to justice, see Carfield, 2005.
3 See Sen, 2009: 231.
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choices, like, say, «attaining a certain level of education», «being adequately 
nourished» or «secure from domestic violence». The CA describes individuals’ 
or groups’ advantages (or disadvantages) in terms of the latter’s actual ability to 
choose among different combinations of achievements. That is, capabilities are 
defined derivately from realizations one has reason to value and stand for one’s 
real opportunities to achieve combinations of such achievements. Thus, capabili-
ties, not primary goods nor welfare nor equal opportunity for welfare, are the 
informational focus proposed by a CA.
Clearly, these few introductory remarks are not intended to provide an ex-
haustive account and justification of either the crucial insights (in terms of the 
concrete evaluative exercises in which a CA has been or can be employed) that 
follow from focusing on such «space» when evaluating one’s disadvantages, or 
of the important and foundational reasons that justify the overarching concen-
tration on such «informational focus» 4, or, and perhaps most importantly, of the 
reasoning behind the choice of which capabilities (once we decide to settle on 
capabilities as the most appropriate «informational focus») we should really be 
concerned about 5. Relatedly, pointing to an important informational focus for 
social assessment and evaluation (and justifying the corresponding choice) does 
not imply a rigid endorsement of any specific formula about how and for what 
concrete purposes that information may be used 6. In fact, and rather fittingly, giv-
en the background premises of the approach itself (which are both substantively 
pluralistic as well as inherently interdisciplinary), it is relatively easy to detect a 
number of explicit disagreements and different points of emphasis and concen-
tration among different authors, who are otherwise endorsing a CA 7.
In short, a CA begins the evaluation of how well (or badly) a particular so-
ciety is doing with one foundational question, that asks: «What are people in 
that society really able to do and be?» 8. This admittedly quite simple and fairly 
straightforward question, when aptly asked, has indeed a number of important 
consequences, both theoretical and practical.
For one thing, it explains the original concern, within the first contemporary 
articulations of the CA, with finding reliable alternatives to growth-based under-
standings of development that, often implicitly, tend to over-concentrate their 
attention on such quantitative estimations as the gross national product (GNp), 
and the gross domestic product (Gdp), or the Gdp per capita; all of which, in 
turn, badly distort one’s understanding of how well a country is doing by, first, 
inviting one to consider distinct and separate elements aspects of human life 
(such as bodily health, or education, or affiliation and so on) as one homogenous 
«good» (leaving no room, that is, for the important qualitative distinctions be-
tween different aspects of one’s life and the kinds of «goods» one may wish to 
4 For the original development of such argument, see Sen, 1980.
5 Compare Sen, 2004: 315 with Nussbaum, 2007: 4; and Anderson, 1999: 316. See also Alkire, 
2002; and Robeyns, 2005.
6 See Sen, 2009: 232.
7 For a critical overview of important differences and disagreements, see Nussbaum, 2003: 33.
8 See Nussbaum, 2007: 4.
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pursue) and, second, by entirely neglecting distribution, thus giving no evalua-
tive weight whatsoever to even significant inequalities.
Second a CA invites scholars to carefully distinguish between the means of 
social progress and development, and the different goals we are well advised to 
pursue through social change or development more generally: as Sen has often 
argued (commenting on the over-reliance on quantitative national income esti-
mation, in its different forms): «The problem does not [...] lie in the fact that the 
pursuit of economic prosperity is typically taken to be a major goal of planning 
and policy making. [...] The problem relates to the level at which this aim should 
be taken as a goal. Is it just an intermediate goal, the importance of which is 
contingent on what it ultimately contributes to human lives? Or is it the object 
of the entire exercise? It is in the acceptance —usually implicitly— of the latter 
view that the ends-means confusion becomes significant —indeed blatant» 9. On 
the contrary, a CA concentrates on the lives and actions of human beings as, at 
the same time, the real beneficiaries of progress (this is what Nussbaum calls the 
«Principle of each person as an end») 10, as well as its potential agents and adjudica-
tors 11.
This multi-focal concentration on human beings and their possibilities of 
meaningful action in the evaluation (and enactment) of social progress and de-
velopment is well reflected in many of the foundational conceptual tools, devel-
oped throughout the years within the CA.
Take, for example, the important distinction between capabilities and func-
tionings (or achievements). As I have mentioned already, capabilities are defined 
derivately from potential achievements one may have reasons to value (being 
well nourished, free of domestic violence, in control of one’s own environment, 
and so on), and stand for one’s real opportunities for realizing such different 
functionings (or combinations of different functionings). Thus, the focus on ca-
pabilities is indeed wider and more capacious than a mere focus on what one 
actually ends up doing (one’s combination of functionings), since it includes, 
crucially, what that person is actually able to do and be (technically, her «capabil-
ity set»), whether or not she chooses to do it 12.
The distinction between capabilities and functionings is extremely useful 
even in the narrower field of access to justice, in many different ways. First and 
most directly, public programs designed to promote access to justice should gen-
erally distinguish and clarify whether their purpose is to increase capabilities, or 
functionings, or a combination of both. Generally, it is capabilities that we should 
be after (real opportunities for meaningful and effective participation in legal 
proceedings, whether one does end up so participating or not). But, at times, 
actual functionings are the relevant informational space (an effective defense 
against ungrounded claims or allegations more generally, no matter one’s actual 
9 Sen, 1989: 41.
10 For an articulation of such principle (and what it entails), see, for example, Nussbaum, 
2007: 14.
11 See Sen, 1994: 31-38.
12 See, for example, Nussbaum, 2007: 12. For a similar argument by Sen, see Sen, 2009: 235-238.
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choices). Second, equal access to justice does not mean complete equalization 
of functionings in legal proceedings («everyone should have an equal distribu-
tion of error rates across all trails he or she participates in»; or «everyone should 
appear as plaintiff and defendant in exactly same number of trials as everyone 
else»), nor complete equalization of capabilities in the legal process (everyone 
should have the same amount of «legal knowledge» and an exactly equal amount 
of resources to leverage it). What policy-recommendations lose in precision (via 
the unequivocal pursuance of exact equivalence), they gain in clarity and detail. 
perfect equalization of capabilities and/or functionings might be hard to even 
conceptualize (as opposed to perfect equivalence of numerable resources), but 
the idea of a threshold level of capabilities and/or functionings is a much more 
credible candidate than the idea a threshold level of resources as an interpreta-
tion of equal access to justice. On one hand, the variety of the typical means de-
ployed in strategies of legal or extra-legal contestation makes «resource» a very 
abstract term. On the other, it is only by focusing on what «resources» are good 
for, that it is possible to posit limits to their overuse. Equal access to justice can-
not mean that everyone should be entitled to waste public resources for frivolous 
litigation; but, rather, it means that public resources should protect everyone’s 
capabilities up to a threshold level equal for all.
Consider now the distinction between basic, internal and combined capabili-
ties, which is articulated especially by Nussbaum. By basic capabilities, Nuss-
baum means «the innate equipment of individuals that is the necessary basis for 
developing the more advanced capabilities»; by internal capabilities, instead, she 
means the «states of the person herself that are, so far as the person herself is 
concerned, sufficient conditions for the exercise of the requisite functions»; and 
finally, by combined capabilities, she means «internal capabilities combined with 
suitable external conditions for the exercise of the function» 13.
This paper’s proposal is to view access to justice as a combined capability, 
possibly requiring the development of a number of internal capabilities (ranging, 
for example, from simple ones like the ability to read and speak or understand 
the language in which one’s legal rights are written, to more complex and fragile 
ones, like the ability to aspire to the legal protection of the law, or to anticipate 
one’s legal position depending on one’s own actions or the actions of others) as 
well as a complex combination of clearly external conditions (the actual impor-
tance and impact of which may significantly vary depending on the development 
of one’s internal capabilities), that could include both the presence of material re-
sources (like, for example, the existence of physically accessible courts, or other 
forums, not too far from where one lives) as well as the availability of effective 
collaborations and coordination with the activities of others (like lawyers, clerks, 
judges and so on).
Interpreting the right of access to justice as a combined capability (rather 
than a single homogeneous entitlement that should be somehow equally allo-
cated to each party of any legal proceeding) has far-reaching consequences in 
13 Nussbaum, 1997: 289.
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many exercises of practical evaluation in the field of access to justice. For one 
thing, careful analysis of the different components of one’s general ability to 
mobilize formal entitlements for valued purposes, might identify the parametric 
variations between different parties in converting procedural entitlements in 
effective and real opportunities for meaningful action and mobilization. Also, 
a comprehensive understanding of the general capability of access to justice 
helps the identification of the distinct effects of attributing a specific entitle-
ment (like the right to counsel) within the larger context of one’s capabilities 
and functionings.
According to familiar concerns over both the legitimacy and the institutional 
competency of courts as concrete vehicles of social change and transformation, 
rendering a specific right (like, for example, the right to health care) directly 
justiciable (by, for example, granting a right to access to Supreme Courts) may 
be too expensive, or even counterproductive for the purposes of effective mo-
bilization and social change. much empirical research in the last decades has 
persuasively shown the various risks (alternatively identified as the cooptation of 
radical discourses within mainstream political talk, or the general ineffectiveness 
of courts as vehicles of social change) in overinvesting in courts, or in lawyer-
based forms of social activism and mobilization 14.
But even granting this much, focus on the combination of one’s abilities in 
activating formal rights in action seems to be a good idea for both governments 
and political movements. Legislative reform risks pointlessness when its intend-
ed beneficiaries are systematically excluded by the legal system. mobilization 
for social change faces very similar risks when those who envision it have little 
knowledge of (and interest in) the present opportunities of formal mobilization 
of rights in courts or other public authorities.
moreover, to claim that, for example, one country should expand equal ac-
cess to justice for the right to health care might not mean that such country 
should necessarily recognize a justiciable remedy for any violation of the right to 
health care. Focus on the combined capability to access to justice for the right 
to health care allows one to concentrate on the distinct rights that can be made 
justiciable (without, say, compromising courts’ institutional competency or legit-
imacy) while at the same time viewing their combination as directly instrumental 
for the protection and expansion of the right to health care.
more generally, the distinction between basic, internal, and combined ca-
pabilities favors the evaluation of the transformative reach of equal access to 
justice along other forms of social contestation, without incarcerating its point 
and reach in narrow legal activism in courts. Access to legal knowledge (both 
the ability to identify events as legally meaningful, and the ability to express such 
meaning competently) and one’s ability to devise intelligent strategies in light 
of legal knowledge, are both centrally connected with the combined capability 
to make claims in court. much intuitively, they seem to be strictly connected 
14 For an insightful critical review of many of the most difficult issues, see S. Cummings and 
d. Rhode, 2009.
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with the ability to devise and coordinate effective practices of social contesta-
tion more generally (from petitioning, to public demonstrations, strike and civil 
disobedience). A CA allows one to gain the insights of seeing litigation (and 
people’s real opportunities to do things with it) both independently as well as in 
the larger context of practices of social contestation 15.
3.  The Uncertain Paths of Constitutionalization: the Right to Legal Aid  
in The U.S.; and Europe
This section provides an account of the different approaches followed by 
the US Supreme Court (after its decision in Gideon v. Wainwright 16), and by the 
European Court of Human Rights (in interpreting the requirements of art. 6 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights).
I discuss such decisions for their political and cultural influence, rather than 
strictly legal one. Correspondingly, no claim is made that the «unequivocal» and 
«unconditional» acceptance by either courts of the general approach suggested 
here (one inspired —that is, by a CA) will necessarily effect a sensible improve-
ment in the level of effective realization of the right of access to justice in the 
US or in Europe. Rather, I consider the US Supreme Court, and the European 
Court of Human Rights as exemplary institutions of public reason and, thus, 
their decisions on access to justice as among the best, and most carefully thought 
through, expressions of the actual difficulties that public institutions face when 
they attempt at providing a systematic understanding of the concrete content 
of the right of access to justice. The underlying and operative assumption, con-
sequently, is that a critical appraisal of both their insights as well as their faults 
might offer valuable contributions to public reason as a whole, both when the 
latter is directed at changing judicial doctrine, as well as when its point is to in-
form social and political reasoning more generally.
3.1. Legal aid in the US Supreme Court: Gideon and beyond
perhaps the clearest focal point for reconstructing the right of access to jus-
tice, as protected by the US Constitution, and interpreted by the US Supreme 
Court, is the famous Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright 17. In 
a nutshell, the Court first construed the Sixth Amendment provision of the 
right to retain counsel for all defendants in criminal proceedings, to mean that 
in federal courts counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ 
counsel. Thus, it concluded that, contrary to the then twenty-one years old rule 
15 Notice that this allows, also, to evaluate the quality of access to justice in a given country without 
endorsing any commitment to, or preference for so called formal procedures of adjudication (as neatly 
distinguished from so called informal ones), and rather test, for any given country, whether formal or 
informal procedures of adjudication are actually conducive to equitable expansions of people’s general 
capabilities. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I should clarify the point.
16 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
17 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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articulated in Betts v. Brady 18, the right to a court-appointed counsel should be 
extended to indigent defendants in State courts as well, through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
more particularly, in Betts the Court argued that the right to appointed coun-
sel for indigent defendants (in non-capital cases) was not of such fundamental 
importance to justify its extension, through the Fourteenth Amendment, on the 
conduct of individual States. But in Gideon the Court observed that «That gov-
ernment hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire 
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that 
lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries» 19. Thus, the Court con-
cluded that «not only [...] precedents but also reason and reflection require us 
to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled 
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless 
counsel is provided for him» 20: «the right to be heard would be, in many cases, 
of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel» 21.
Since Gideon’s decision, the Supreme Court had several opportunities to 
both expand its initial articulation of the right to legal aid, as well as mark more 
precisely the point beyond which the US Constitution does not protect indi-
gent parties when the latter try to defend their rights in a court of law. So, for 
example, in Gault 22, the Court significantly expanded the scope of the rule first 
articulated in Gideon also to non-criminal proceedings, stating that youth in civil 
juvenile delinquency proceedings have a due process right to an appointed coun-
sel whenever they risk a potential loss of liberty 23.
On the contrary direction, in Gagnon the Court found no right to counsel for 
criminal defendants facing revocation of probation and imprisonment 24. more-
over, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services the Court found a presumption 
against a right to counsel for indigent parties in civil proceedings leading to a 
potential loss of parental rights, arguing that a «pre-eminent generalization that 
emerges from this Court’s precedents on an indigent’s right to appointed counsel 
is that such a right has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose 
his physical liberty if he loses the litigation» 25.
However, the Court granted that such presumption could be defeated, on 
a case by case basis, by balancing against it the three factors listed in Mathews 
v. Eldrige and which, since then, govern the allocation of procedural guarantees 
in non-criminal proceedings 26. These factors include: first, the nature of the pri-
vate interest that will be affected; second, the comparative risk of an erroneous 
18 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
19 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
20 Id. at 344.
21 Id. at 344, 345. This is a direct quotation from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
22 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967).
23 See, however, Frankel, 2011: 98, arguing that «The rationale behind the Court’s holding in 
Gault [...] would apply with equal force to youth in removal proceedings».
24 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
25 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981).
26 Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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deprivation of that interest with and without additional procedural safeguards; 
and, finally, the nature and magnitude of the Government’s (or any other) coun-
tervailing interest in not providing additional or substitute procedural require-
ments.
most recently, in Turner v. Rogers (which was a civil-contempt case for 
Turner’s willful failure to pay court-ordered child support, ending with Turn-
er’s incarceration for one year) the Supreme Court struggled to reach a middle 
ground between these two opposing tendencies (one pulling for a limitation of 
possible procedural safeguards in non-criminal cases, and the other one pull-
ing toward an extension of Gideon’s legacy in non-criminal proceedings) 27. 
michael Turner, the petitioner in the case, had been sent to prison for twelve 
months for civil contempt for willful failure to pay court-ordered child sup-
port over a period of three years. (Even though their consequences may in-
deed look very similar —namely, losing one’s own «physical liberty»— civil 
contempt differs from criminal contempt since the former only seeks to coerce 
the defendant to do what the court has already ordered him to do and, thus, 
once the defendant complies, he is «purged» of the contempt and free —for 
these reasons, the defendant is said to «carry the keys of his prison in his own 
pocket»).
Turner argued that his procedural due process rights had been violated since 
he lacked legal representation at his contempt hearing, being unable to afford it. 
The Court, however, on one hand reaffirmed Lassiter’s «pre-eminent generaliza-
tion» that no «categorical» right to counsel could be attributed to non-criminal 
defendants, and found that the application of the Mathews test could not over-
come the presumption against the right to counsel in civil proceedings in the 
specific case at hand: Turner, though risking a potential loss of liberty (which, 
in fact, he suffered), was not entitled to a lawyer paid by the State 28. But, on the 
other hand, the Court vacated the South Carolina Supreme Court’s judgment, 
and found that the trial court did not employ adequate procedural safeguards 
which, even though less expensive than the provision of counsel, would have 
guaranteed Turner’s effective opportunities to identify the most crucial issues in 
his case and, eventually, adduce evidence concerning such issues 29. more specifi-
cally, the Court found that such «alternative procedural safeguards» should have 
included: notice to the defendant that his «ability to pay» is a critical issue in 
contempt proceedings; the use of a form to elicit relevant financial information; 
an opportunity at the hearing to respond to statements and questions about his 
financial status; and an express finding by the court that the defendant has the 
ability to pay 30.
27 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2514 (2011). For an illustrative discussion on the contested 
potential legacy of Turner, see Russel Engler, 2013: 31. See also the material available at http://www.
concurringopinions.com/archives/category/symposium-turner-v-rogers.
28 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011).
29 Id., 2523 (2011).
30 Id., 2521 (2011).
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3.2.  from retaining one’s lawyer to access to justice: from formal 
opportunities to capabilities
The US Supreme Court’s approach with respect to the allocation of the right 
to counsel (as reconstructed thus far) uses three different arguments. First, there 
is an argument based on a textual reading of the Constitution and, more specifi-
cally, on the Sixth Amendment provision regarding the right to retain counsel 
in criminal proceedings 31. A second argument assigns specific priority to one’s 
interests in her own «physical liberty», over and against any other of one’s free-
doms and capabilities 32. Finally, a third argument laments the need for tragic de-
cisions in the allocation of legal services to those who are unable to afford them, 
especially in a world of scarce resources 33.
According to the analysis proposed here, such approach runs into difficulties 
on two general grounds: first, if the Supreme Court is right in recognizing a con-
stitutional commitment to financing legal aid for the indigent criminal defendant 
(as I believe it is), then it has offered very few plausible reasons for not extending 
such commitment to a broader group of indigent parties. Second, the Mathews-
Eldridge test, which governs (since Lassiter v. Department of Social Services 34) 
the way in which judges are supposed to allocate procedural due process rights 
(including the right to legal aid) in non-criminal settings, fails to capture much of 
what is normatively relevant and tends to produce unreasonable results.
judge Thomas, writing for the minority in Turner (in a dissent joined by 
Scalia, Roberts and Alito), argued that «under an original understanding of the 
Constitution, there is no basis for concluding that the guarantee of due pro-
cess secures a right to appointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings» 35. The 
Sixth Amendment is the only constitutional provision that mentions any right 
to counsel, and «the fact that a constitutional provision expressly provides a 
right to counsel in specific circumstances indicates that the Constitution does 
not also sub silentio provide that right far more broadly in another, more general, 
provision» 36: «ordinarily we do not read a general provision to render a specific 
one superfluous».
And yet, if we look at the actual practices, mores, and interpretations followed 
by courts (both state as well as federal), the fact that the Supreme Court, in Gide-
on, needed something more than a mere textual reading of the 6th Amendment, 
in order to extend the right to counsel to parties in state criminal proceedings, 
becomes rather apparent. For one thing, it is not at all clear that counsel origi-
nally referred to «licensed attorney» 37. And, certainly, the 6th Amendment did 
31 See, especially, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2515 (2011) and Id. at 2524-2526 (j. Thomas, 
dissenting)
32 See, for example, Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 28 (1981).
33 Barton and Bibas, 2012: 967 argue that in Turner the Court got it right (not unduly expanding 
the right to counsel in civil cases, but struggling to find other, less expensive, viable, solutions).
34 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
35 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2524 (2011).
36 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2526 (2011).
37 See Rhode, 2004: 51.
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not require the appointment of counsel to indigent parties before Gideon, even 
in federal criminal proceedings. The general practice for all the 19th Century was, 
instead, to require the appointment of counsel for the indigent only in cases of 
treason or other capital crimes 38. Finally, consider: up until at least the begin-
ning of the 20th Century the vast majority of cases filed in Courts (both state and 
federal) were criminal ones. Since then, non-criminal filings have taken up and, 
then, largely surpassed criminal ones 39. Why can we not say, then, that the ex-
pression «right to counsel in criminal proceedings» originally referred to «right 
to counsel in whatever area of law people most frequently end up in courts for»?
No simple reconstruction of the practices and mores concerning a right to 
counsel can provide a univocal justification of the current allocation of the right 
to counsel, nor would such reconstruction allow the recognition of a categorical 
right to counsel for the indigent defendant even in criminal proceedings. Rather, 
the Court in Gideon needed to articulate an interpretation of what we would 
now call a right to «meaningful access to justice» that could, first, provide an in-
terpretation of procedural rights and guarantees as real opportunities for action 
and participation in legal proceedings, rather than mere formal rights and con-
straints to State action (and, thus, capture the difference between a mere right to 
retain one’s own counsel and an effective right to counsel, no matter one’s ability 
to pay for it) 40. Second, the Court had to show the arbitrariness of the distinction 
between capital and non-capital cases, with respect to such interpretation of pro-
cedural rights 41; and, third, overturn the so-called «special circumstances» rule, 
which dominated courts’ decisions regarding the right to counsel before Gideon 
and that conditioned the recognition of the right to the existence of such «special 
circumstances» 42. Interestingly, the latter were typically thought to include «the 
ignorance, the illiteracy, their youth [...], the circumstances of public hostility» 43, 
or, more simply, the complexity of the legal questions presented 44 —in sum, ex-
actly the kind of circumstances that could make the formal attribution of rights 
(like the right to retain one’s own counsel) of little avail, depriving one of real 
opportunities to enjoy them.
The contrast between the interpretation of procedural rights as mere formal 
constraints for the behavior of authorities or as real and effective opportunities 
for action and participation in legal proceedings was clearly not an invention of 
Gideon’s majority, however. For example, it was anticipated by judge Sutherland 
in Powell v. Alabama 45 (a decision which, in turn, was heavily quoted by the 
Gideon’s Court), when, wrestling with the then dominant interpretation of the 
38 See Rhode, 2004: 51 (quoting 19th Century Federal Statutes, regulating the right to retain 
counsel).
39 Resnik, 2011: 78.
40 See the language used in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), especially at 345, 346.
41 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338, 339, 340 (1963) and Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 
(1942).
42 For a discussion of the «special circumstances rule», see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
350, 351 (1963).
43 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
44 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 351 (1963).
45 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
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6th Amendment as attributing to the criminal defendant a mere right to retain 
counsel, he argued that «even if opportunity had been given to employ counsel 46 
[...], we are of opinion that, under the circumstances just stated [the ignorance, 
the illiteracy, their youth [...], the circumstances of public hostility], the necessity 
of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trail court to make 
an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process» 47. In-
terestingly, a few paragraphs above the quoted sentence, Sutherland seems to be 
willing to extend the recognition of a right to counsel even further, breaking the 
strong connection (quite clear in the quoted passage) between such recognition 
and the existence of «special circumstances» 48 —as, for example, the «ignorance, 
illiteracy, the youth» of the defendants, and where the latter are a necessary con-
dition for the former— when he notes that: «Even the intelligent and educated 
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law... He requires the 
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him» 49.
3.3.  The dubious grounds of a utilitarian calculus in allocating access  
to justice
In Lassiter 50, the US Supreme Court established a weighty presumption 
against the appointment of counsel in non-criminal proceedings, and directed 
courts to weight, in order to overcome such presumption, the following consid-
erations: 1) the nature of the private interest that will be affected; 2) the com-
parative risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest with and without addi-
tional procedural safeguards; 3) the nature and magnitude of the Government’s 
countervailing interest in not providing additional or substitute procedural re-
quirements 51.
The Court’s central holding has not remained immune from harsh criticism, 
however, on several counts 52. For one thing, and quite apart from the actual 
persuasiveness of the Court’s approach itself, there is much reason to doubt 
that lower courts have actually followed the Supreme Court’s main holding very 
closely 53. In fact, the application of the Mathews’ test to the Lassiter’s fact pattern 
46 judge Sutherland here is referring to the fact that the trial court even failed to give the defen-
dants reasonable time to secure the appointment of a counsel [287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932)]. For an extended 
discussion (of the broader fact-pattern in Powell itself) see also Beaney, 1955.
47 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
48 One problem with the «special circumstances» rule is well captured by a quote attributed to 
an appellate lawyer and reported by deborah Rhode (see Rhode, 2004: 57): «How can a judge, when 
a man is arraigned, look at him and say there are special circumstances: does the judge say, “You look 
stupid?”».
49 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 69 (1932).
50 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
51 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981).
52 See, for example, Resnik, 2011: 78; pastore, 2006: 186; Abel, 2006: 527; Symposium, 2006: 163. 
See also, mashaw, 1981.
53 The due process standards enforced in removal proceedings for minors in immigration courts 
offer another rather striking example of such divergence between the rule explicitly announced, and 
the rule which is actually followed in allocating the right to counsel in the non-criminal domain (how-
ever that is defined, in turn). Under current immigration law, minors facing deportation are not entitled 
348 mARCO SEGATTI
could have easily allowed an exactly opposite decision, granting the recognition 
of a right to counsel in proceedings potentially leading to the termination of 
parental rights 54.
One possible reason is the substantial difficulty in actually doing the calcula-
tion proposed by the Supreme Court. As judith Resnik summed it all up, «while 
one can state the equation [referring here to the Mathews’ test], one cannot do 
the math because data are missing» 55, concluding that «its [the Mathews’ test’s] 
veneer of scientific constraints on judicial judgment can serve to mask the lack 
of genuine empiricism» 56.
Even short of conclusive answers provided by adequate studies on the likely 
impact of different procedural arrangements (like the right to counsel for indi-
gent parties) on the actual capabilities of actual or potential litigants, we might 
still discuss whether the questions that the Lassiter’s Court is posing are indeed 
adequate to the task of pointing the interpreter’s attention to justifiable goals 
and to a perspicuous understanding of what it means to have effective access to 
justice.
First of all, note the ambiguity with which the Court defines the competing 
interests that need to be balanced. For example, the Court seems to interpret 
both the private interests of the parties, as well as the countervailing Govern-
ment’s interest rather narrowly —that is, as having to do only with the interests 
that are litigated in the specific proceeding under scrutiny. This would inevitably 
exclude all the other interests which, depending on the broader context of the 
litigation itself, or of the particular lives of the parties involved, could be effect-
ed and with respect to which the protection of the interests actually in dispute 
serves only instrumentally. Within this much broader evaluative framework, the 
recognition of a right to counsel for indigent parties in one particular area of the 
law could be justified in light of its instrumental value in protecting such parties’ 
interests in other domains and contexts.
Second, and relatedly, the Court does not seem to pay much attention to 
the obvious differences, in the evaluation of one’s interest in a legal proceeding, 
to a right to counsel for the proceedings adjudicating the legality of their immigration status and are 
thus expected to «navigate» the immigration system by themselves. But, as Elizabeth Frankel has per-
suasively shown, carefully weighting the competing interests identified in Mathews, the child’s interests 
(potential loss of liberty, disruption of family ties, removal from the country) are particularly weighty in 
removal proceedings; the risks of an erroneous deprivation of such interests without the appointment 
of counsel are substantial; and the weight of the Government’s countervailing interest in not providing 
counsel to minors facing removal is at least dubious. See Frankel, 2011: 104. moreover, according to 
patton, 1996: 195, in some jurisdictions family courts do not even hold Lassiter’s hearings.
54 See, for example, judge Blackmun’s dissent in Lassiter [452 U.S. 18, 36 (1981)], methodically 
applying the mathews’ test to the facts at issue. For a detailed analysis of the reasoning of judge powell 
(who concurred and joined j. Stewart’s opinion for the majority) and judge Blackmun (who filed a dis-
sent, joined by judges marshall and Brennan with judge Stevens filing a separate dissent), using their 
personal notes and papers, see Hornstein, 2010. Hornstein’s argument is that the key issue in the case 
turned out to be, quite simply, mrs. Lassiter’s poverty and the fact that the five justices of the majority 
identified her, perhaps not entirely unreasonably, as an «underserving poor» —but, of course, it is not 
at all clear how that should settle the question of whether she had a right to counsel or not.
55 Resnik, 2011: 158.
56 Resnik, 2011: 158.
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among different kinds of litigants and parties. For example, one’s interests in 
not losing her home, or her employment, may vary quite sensibly depending on 
whether one can readily substitute such goods and opportunities through the 
market or through some other mechanism. perhaps, such neglect is not entirely 
unreasonable within Lassiter’s fact pattern itself, since the interests at issue there 
were a mother’s parental rights. And yet, it is not at all hard to imagine actual 
situations (like the ones mentioned above), in which paying closer attention to 
the significance of the particular litigation at hand within the larger context of 
the litigants actual freedoms and opportunities, could sensibly alter one’s inter-
pretation of the nature and magnitude of the interests at stake.
Finally, consider the second criterion listed in the Mathews’ test, which re-
quires courts to evaluate the comparative risk of an erroneous deprivation of the 
party’s personal interest with or without additional procedural safeguards.
Note that a mere comparative risk assessment of different procedural ar-
rangements would deliberately exclude the possible expressive significance of 
enabling parties to effectively litigate their rights, by enforcing norms of equal 
standing within a free and unrestricted public articulation of one’s reasons. more 
generally, the need to pay close attention to the actual capabilities of the parties, 
and compare them in order to determine the proper level of procedural safe-
guards could be even justified on purely consequentialist grounds. In fact, some 
language both in Lassiter’s dissent, as well as in Turner’s majority opinion, would 
seem to suggest that the recognition of a right to counsel in non-criminal pro-
ceedings could be triggered by the simple fact that the other party is represented 
by counsel, since in this latter scenario the risk of an erroneous result would 
inevitably increase.
3.4.  The protection of civil legal aid in the European Convention  
of Human Rights
Golder v. United Kingdom (1975), and Airey v. Irland (1979) are both two 
well-known decisions by the European Court of Human Rights. Notwithstand-
ing their notoriety, a detailed analysis of the two decisions might prove illuminat-
ing and useful. For one thing, the textual material used by the ECHR to reach 
the first recognition of the right of access to justice (that is, art. 6, par. 1 of the 
Convention) is, all in all, very similar to the standard, «open courts», «fair and 
public hearing», «right to be heard» clauses, which are found in so many tradi-
tions of constitutional texts (including the US Federal Constitution). moreover, 
art. 6 of the Convention, like the US Constitution, explicitly recognize a right to 
legal aid only to criminal defendants. Also, the contrast between the two oppos-
ing interpretations of procedural rights (as mere formal restraints on state action, 
or as real opportunities for action and participation) appears rather clearly in the 
two ECHR’s decisions.
On the evening of the 24th October 1969, a riot broke out in parkhurst pris-
on, United Kingdom. Laird, a prison officer, was injured in an attempt at quell-
ing such «disturbance». In a first statement describing the events, the officer 
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identified Elmer Golder, who was serving a fifteen years term for robbery with 
violence, as being among those that «were swinging vicious blows at me» 57.
On 20th march 1970, suspecting that «it is this [Laird’s accusations] that has 
prevented [Golder] from being recommended by the parole board for parole» 58, 
Golder addressed a petition to the Secretary State for the Home department, 
asking for permission to consult a solicitor «with a view to taking civil action for 
libel».
In march 1971, Golder submitted two complaints to the European Commis-
sion on Human Rights, challenging the Home Secretary’s rejection of his appli-
cation. In one of these, in particular, Golder argued that the Home Secretary’s 
refusal to permit him to consul a solicitor, constituted a violation of his right of 
access to justice, granted by art. 6, par. 1 of European Convention on Human 
Rights 59.
Against Golder’s petition, the UK Government argued that art. 6 does not 
recognize a right of access to justice, but, rather, confers to the parties already 
involved in legal proceedings a right to a fair trial and hearing 60 —thus, the 
Government concluded, the rights recognized by article 6 do not extend their 
protections to the actual opportunities that one has in instituting a particular 
legal procedure, but only confer procedural safeguards once such proceedings 
have been already instituted.
In any case, the Government added, even «if the Court finds that the rights 
conferred by Article 6 (art. 6) include in general a right of access to courts, then 
the United Kingdom Government submit that the right of access to the courts is 
not unlimited in the case of persons under detention» 61. Thus, the Government 
concluded that the imposition of a reasonable restraint on access to the courts 
might be permissible in the interest of prison order and discipline and that, in 
this case, «the refusal of the United Kingdom Government to allow the applicant 
to consult a lawyer was within the degree of restraint permitted» 62.
In its decision, the Court relied on four different arguments. First, the 
Court argued that even though the United Kingdom did not formally deny 
Golder of his right to institute proceedings before a court and, in any case, it 
did so de facto only temporarily (since, as the Government argued, on obtain-
ing his release, Golder would have been in a position to have recourse to the 
courts at will), the Home Secretary did in fact prevent him to commencing 
an action. And, the Court concluded, «hindrance in fact can contravene the 
Convention just like a legal impediment»: «hindering the effective exercise 
of a right may amount to a breach of that right, even if the hindrance is of a 
temporary character» 63.
57 Golder v. UK, 4451/70, judgment of 21 February 1975, p. 4.
58 Id., p. 5.
59 Id., p. 6.
60 Id., p. 7.
61 Id., p. 7.
62 Id., p. 7.
63 Id., p. 9.
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Second, the Court relied on a close textual reading of art. 6, especially in its 
French version 64, to conclude that the «right to be heard» (in the French ver-
sion: «droit à ce que sa cause soit entendue»; which in English becomes «right to 
a [fair] and [public] hearing») therein recognized, should not be interpreted as 
being only limited to procedural safeguards recognized to the parties of proceed-
ings which have been already instituted (that is, as rights pertaining merely to the 
«hearing»). Rather, the Court recognized that such clause explicitly extends its 
protection to the very institution of legal proceedings (thus, as the French ver-
sion makes clearer, as the right that one’s «cause» is heard).
Third, the Court relied on the preamble of the European Convention, and, in 
particular, on the latter’s reference to the «Rule of Law», as a common heritage 
of European countries that are members of the Council of Europe, concluding 
that «in civil matters one can scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there 
being a possibility of having access to the courts» 65, and, even more emphatically, 
«It would be inconceivable, in the opinion of the Court, that Article 6 para. 1 
(art. 6-1) should describe in detail the procedural guarantees afforded to parties 
in a pending lawsuit and should not first protect that which alone makes it in 
fact possible to benefit from such guarantees, that is, access to a court. The fair, 
public and expeditious characteristics of judicial proceedings are of no value at 
all if there are no judicial proceedings» 66.
Finally, the Court, having firmly established a first articulation of the right of 
access to justice as an essential and integral component of the right to a fair trial 
and public hearing recognized by art. 6, confronted the further problem of jus-
tifying a reasonable rationale for establishing limitations to its concrete enforce-
ment. Unfortunately, the Court fell short of elaborating, in her words, «a general 
theory of the limitations admissible in the case of convicted prisoners», or in the 
case of other potential parties to legal proceedings.
However, the Court noted that the point of Golder’s request to consult a 
lawyer was to try to exculpate himself, by suing Laird (the prison officer who 
accused him of taking part in the riot) for libel. Relatedly, the Court stressed that 
the contemplated legal proceedings would have dealt with incidents connected 
with «prison life», likely affecting Golder’s conditions of imprisonment. Finally, 
the Court, in recognizing that the right of access to justice should not be seen 
as an «absolute right» (which means, in the Court’s terminology, that the right 
itself could admit some limitations), proposed a striking analogy with the right 
to education. In particular, the Court noted that, like the right to education, the 
right of access to justice too, by its very nature, calls for regulation by the State, 
adding that such regulation «may vary in time and place according to the needs 
and resources of the community and of individuals» 67, but should never «injure 
the substance» 68 of the right.
64 Id., p. 10.
65 Id., p. 13
66 Id., p. 13.
67 Id., p. 14.
68 Id., p. 14.
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In Airey v. Ireland 69, the Court further articulated the right of access to justice 
in a significant way, clarifying (in contrast with, as we shall see, some language in 
Golder, arising from the particular fact-pattern in that case) that the very content 
of such right, as recognized by the European Convention, includes positive obli-
gations to assure that the rights guaranteed by the Convention are not «theoreti-
cal and illusory», but «practical and effective» 70.
mrs. Airey was an Irish citizen, married with four children. Since june 1972, 
mrs. Airey tried to obtain a decree of judicial separation, grounded on her 
husband’s alleged physical and mental cruelty to her and her children (in fact, 
mr. Airey was eventually convicted for assaulting her and fined. Also, he persis-
tently refused to conclude a separation agreement), but «in the absence of legal 
aid and not being in a financial position to meet herself the costs involved» 71, she 
was unable to secure the services of a lawyer. (The readers may recall that in 1972 
divorce did not exist in Ireland).
Thus, mrs. Airey addressed the Commission, alleging, among other issues 
that, because of the prohibitive costs of the proceedings, she could not obtain a 
judicial separation and, thus, that her right of access to justice, as articulated in 
Golder and recognized in art. 6.1 of the Convention, had been violated.
In order to contest mrs. Airey’s allegations, the Irish Government adduced 
several arguments, four of which deserve close scrutiny, since the Court’s replies, 
in turns, might help us to highlight a number of key features of the Court’s over-
all approach.
The Government argued, first, that mrs. Airey did, in fact, enjoy access to 
the courts, since she was free to go before the court without the assistance of a 
lawyer» 72.
Second, the Government tried to distinguish the Golder case, arguing that, 
there, the applicant (mr. Golder) had been effectively prevented from having 
access to the court. Here, instead, mrs. Airey faced no obstacle posed by the 
State, but, rather, asked herself for a positive intervention by the Irish Govern-
ment.
Third, the Government noted how recognizing a right to legal aid to mrs. 
Airey, would inevitably force the Court to recognize a similar protection in all 
cases concerning the determination of a civil right, thus rendering the provision 
contained in article 6.3, that recognizes a right to legal aid only in criminal cas-
es, entirely superfluous (this is what judge Thomas, of the US Supreme Court, 
feared with respect to the 6th Amendment of the US Constitution).
Finally, the Government lamented that art. 6 of the European Convention 
should not be interpreted «so as to achieve social and economic developments in 
a Contracting State; such developments can only be progressive» 73.
69 Airey v. Ireland, 6289/73, judgment of 9 October 1979.
70 Id., p. 9.
71 Id., p. 3.
72 Id., p. 9.
73 Id., p. 11.
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In contrast with these arguments, the Court observed that the Convention is 
not intended to guarantee rights that are «theoretical and illusory», but «prac-
tical and effective». Thus, the Court identified the central issue in the Airey 
case as consisting on whether mrs. Airey appearance before the court without 
being assisted by a lawyer could ever be effective, «in the sense of whether 
she would be able to present her case properly and satisfactorily» 74. In par-
ticular, the Court argued that proceedings in the Irish High Court (the forum 
where mrs. Airey could have had a decree of judicial separation) are distinc-
tively complex. Furthermore, the Court added that «litigation of this kind, in 
addition to involving complicated points of law, necessitates proof of adultery, 
unnatural practices or, as in the present case, cruelty; to establish the facts, 
expert evidence may have to be tendered and witnesses may have to be found, 
called and examined. What is more, marital disputes often entail an emotional 
involvement that is scarcely compatible with the degree of objectivity required 
by advocacy in court» 75.
Having thus clarified the formulation of the right of access to justice con-
tained in Golder as possibly requiring a positive action on the part of the State, to 
«safeguard the individual in a real and effective way» 76, the Court went on and 
argued that «the mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention may extend 
into the sphere of social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor 
against such an interpretation; there is no water-tight division separating that 
sphere from the field covered by the Convention» 77.
Finally, the Court excluded that its conclusion in Airey could be generalized 
in all civil cases and for all parties involved therein, and recognized (in a language 
quite similar to the one used in Turner by the US Supreme Court), that the insti-
tution of legal aid constitutes one of the means by which a State may guarantee 
effective access to justice, as required by art. 6 of the Convention; but, also, that 
there are possibly other means available, such as, for example, a simplification of 
procedure 78.
In sum, the ECHR seems to have taken a much more pro-active approach to 
the right of access to justice, than the one followed by the US Supreme Court, 
explicitly recognizing, for example, a possibly very broad duty to positive actions 
by States, like the recognition of publicly-financed system of legal aid, directed 
at safeguarding individual parties in a real and effective way, even in civil cases.
But the Court did not go very far in the concrete specification of the content 
of such positive duties. The Court does not articulate, on one hand, the precise 
obstacles that, hindering one’s effective access to the courts, would trigger the 
State’s positive duty of assistance to indigent parties and, on the other, the com-
peting limitations to the right itself and whose existence would, correspondingly, 
discharge such duties.
74 Id., p. 10.
75 Id., p. 10.
76 Id., p. 12.
77 Id., p. 12.
78 Id., p. 12.
354 mARCO SEGATTI
 
4. Spiraling Capabilities and Corrosive Disadvantages in Access to justice
Once governments recognize a general commitment to financing legal aid for 
at least a portion of indigent parties, a number of difficult and urgent questions 
begin to call for attention. In particular, it is important to know how to prioritize 
which and whose claims. And, correspondingly, which and whose claims do not 
deserve special attention.
Thus, one challenge for any approach to access to justice is to produce a 
systematic assessment of the impact of different institutional designs on the lives 
of each and everyone of the individual users of law, while, at the same time, iden-
tifying when tragic choices are really called for and proposing strategies for their 
temporary solution and long term eradication.
Two ideas recently introduced within a CA (the idea of corrosive disadvan-
tage and the related idea of fertile functioning, or spiraling capability 79) may help 
to do just that —that is, assigning special priority to specific legal claims.
In their work on Disadvantage, Wolff and de-Shalit’s central goal is to pro-
vide and philosophically justify a method which is able to identify the least 
advantaged group in any given society, and propose reasonable policy initia-
tives to improve their «lot» 80. Crucially, Wolff and de-Shalit’s first step is to 
provide a list of central human functionings (they find six: life, bodily health, 
bodily integrity, control over one’s environment, affiliation and sense, imagina-
tion and thought), on whose central importance for «a life going well», they 
argue, a reasonable consensus could be reached among different people and 
social groups.
Having set the stage this way, Wolff and de-Shalit introduce a number of 
different «observation-concepts», that could «guide» empirical research, which 
looks at performance on the six categories of functionings among different indi-
viduals and social groups.
The simplest of such «observation-concepts» is what they call «clustering» 81 
or «dynamic clustering», which consist in an observation of possible correla-
tions between different disadvantages. Such observation can be made looking at 
«snapshot» figures of different disadvantages, tracking the extent to which they 
actually cluster for different groups of individuals, or, more interestingly, look-
ing, in longer time-intervals, at the progressive deterioration of different func-
tionings (hence the idea of «dynamic clustering»).
The distinction between corrosive disadvantage 82 and fertile functioning 83 
builds upon the observation of cluster of disadvantages, looking for possible 
79 See Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007: 121-126, 133, 134. See also dixon and Nussbaum, 2013: 558 for 
a discussion of the possible uses of the two concepts mentioned here, in the context of children’s rights.
80 Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007: 121.
81 Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007: 121, 122.
82 Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007: 121, 122.
83 Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007: 121, 122.
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causal connections (which are left unobserved by mere statistical observations of 
«clusters») between capabilities failures in one domain and capabilities failures 
in another; or, conversely, searching for the possible «spill overs» of enhancing 
one’s capabilities in one domain, in other domains as well.
Now, note that the two notions, even though obviously related, are not 
one and the same (with one being the mere converse of the other) —that is, 
identifying a corrosive disadvantage, even though possibly quite instructive, 
may very well not tell us everything we want to know about possible fertile 
functionings.
Take, for example, the possible (and indeed, highly probable) relation be-
tween low-income and frequency of unmet legal needs. The former disadvan-
tage, especially in a legal system without legal aid, or with costly access fees (and 
no system of waiver for indigent parties) can, indeed, be quite corrosive. And 
yet, the corresponding functioning (that is, having enough income to be able to 
pay for a lawyer, or short of that, living in a country that does protect at least a 
portion of indigent parties by providing free legal aid) may not be, when taken 
in isolation, particularly fertile: one may still be not aware of her legal rights, or 
too scared and humiliated to even aspire to vindicate them, or, even if well aware 
and not scared, rather hopeless that hiring a lawyer would do much to solve her 
problems.
So, what would be the advantage, for constitutional courts, or courts more 
generally, to reflect on the two ideas of corrosive disadvantage and fertile func-
tionings when articulating the content of the right of access to justice (or any of 
its partial aspects, explicitly recognized in current legislations)?
First, attending to such two ideas makes the interpretation of procedural due 
process requirements as real opportunities for action and participation inevita-
bly explicit. It would make little sense to ponder on, say, the fertility of recogniz-
ing a particular procedural right, without asking, also, whether the correspond-
ing capability has been guaranteed as well, beyond the mere formal recognition 
of the right itself.
Second, the two ideas immediately direct the interpreter to consider the value 
of any of such real opportunities for action (like the right of counsel), or a com-
bined set of them (like the recognition of a right to counsel, together with a 
simplification of procedural devices, or, even more broadly, the recognition of 
new substantive claims) within the broader context of the lives of either actual 
or potential parties. Recall that this is one of the weaknesses that I have de-
tected within the approach of the US Supreme Court and, even if perhaps a bit 
mitigated, also within the approach of the ECHR. Conversely, the focus on the 
possible fertility of one or a group of functionings or capabilities within the legal 
process immediately calls for a broader evaluation of the possible impact of dif-
ferent procedural arrangements on a set of fundamental substantive functionings 
and capabilities.
In fact, the need to re-direct both scholarly and political attention from the 
narrow focus on individual claims and legal needs, to a more comprehensive 
view of people’s encounters with the legal system, corresponds to one traditional 
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criticism of the current delivery of legal services, and, in particular, of the use of 
individualized legal aid to overcome market-based inequities 84. If unmet legal 
needs tend in fact to cluster across different legal domains within the most dis-
advantaged sections of the population within a given country (as some empirical 
evidence would, indeed, seem to suggest 85), then the need to tackle the corre-
sponding injustice by shifting our focus from a, if you will, case by case rationale 
(where different areas of law and legal domains are treated separately) to a more 
attentive observation of the potential fertility (or current corrosiveness), within 
the broader capabilities of disadvantaged individuals or communities, of meet-
ing currently unmet legal needs (or leaving them unfulfilled), becomes rather 
apparent.
Furthermore, the bifocal attention to the two notion of fertile functioning 
and corrosive disadvantage is capacious enough to account also for the possible 
expressive significance of expanding people’s capabilities (or, conversely, of nar-
rowly curtailing them) to mobilize legal rules and formal entitlements to pursue 
goals they value, monitoring the highly complex interrelations between, for ex-
ample, one’s conception of her own self and social identity, and her propensity, 
ability or aspiration, to effectively carry on the effective mobilization of her own 
rights and entitlements.
For example, in a pioneering work on people’s life stories and encounters 
with the law, Engel and munger 86 provide a perspicuous description of the dif-
ferent mechanisms that may produce such complex (and largely unexplored) 
interrelations, in the context of the enactment, in the USA, of the American 
with disabilities Act of 1990. In particular, Engel and munger, enlarging their 
focus to include an analysis of how rights are activated in people’s everyday lives 
(beyond, that is, the most formal encounters with the legal system, like trials) 
find both that people’s past experiences, forging their sense of identity and social 
relations tend indeed to spill over, affecting the ways in which people see the pur-
pose and use of activating their entitlements, formally recognized, as well as, that 
gaining access to such activation and mobilization may, in turns, allow people 
to forge new identities and self-conceptions affecting the ways in which they 
recollect and tell their own stories and past-experiences 87. Clearly, much more 
empirical research and local knowledge is required (as munger and Engel admit) 
to even begin to make qualified claims regarding such interrelations. And yet, the 
use and exploration of the CA, when aptly integrated with the two observation-
concepts presented here, does seem to provide a reliable framework for carrying 
on an analysis of this kind in an intelligent way —and, which is at least equally 
important, a sound rationale for doing so.
Third, attention to the two notions presented here (and, consequently, the 
search for sensible information on their actual manifestations within a legal sys-
84 See, for example, Abel, 1979.
85 See, for example, pleasence, Balmer, Buck, O’Grady and Genn, 2010; pleasence, Balmer, Buck, 
Smith and patel, 2007; pleasence, Balmer and Buck, 2006.
86 Engel and munger, 2003.
87 Engel and munger, 2003: 78, 88, 89.
A CApABILITIES AppROACH TO ACCESS TO jUSTICE. UNFULFILLEd pROmISES... 357
tem) would equip courts and policy makers with an intelligent rationale for al-
locating scarce resources among competing legal claims and needs, by directing 
them to pay close attention both to the comparative pay offs within the lives 
of actual and potential parties of protecting one group of indigent parties or 
another, as well as the actual vulnerabilities associated with unmet legal needs. 
Recall that the need for such tragic choices in decisions regarding the allocation 
of a right to counsel constitutes one rather common justification for the exclu-
sion of such right (and, more generally, for a less expansive understanding of 
procedural rights and guarantees) in the civil context, as opposed to the criminal 
context. On the contrary, an informed understanding of the possible fertility 
of a group of procedural arrangements, or, conversely, of the corrosiveness of 
their absence, might help to (at least) better qualify the rather harsh distinction 
between criminal and civil proceedings, which the US Supreme Court currently 
sees as foundational, in allocating the right to legal aid.
For example, gaining such kind of reliable information might help scholars, 
courts or policy makers more generally, to detect what Wolff and de-Shalit call 
inverse cross-category risk 88 (that is, the tendency of people to risk and possibly 
compromise one or more functionings, in an attempt at securing the enjoyment 
of other functionings) within unmet legal needs (that is, the possibility that at-
tempting to secure a particular functioning by gaining the protection of the law, 
may come at serious risk and peril of another important functioning in another 
domain, or vice versa). Again, much more empirical research is needed even to 
begin to make educated guesses about the actual frequency (and, correspond-
ingly, relevance) of such phenomena. And yet, if this is even partially true, then 
merely relying on legal aid in criminal proceedings, even though its absence 
would be indeed corrosive, might very well be not very much «fertile», leaving 
the force that actually pushes people toward risking their physical liberties sub-
stantially untouched.
5. Conclusion
This paper began with Curtis and Resnik’s pessimistic remarks on the pros-
pects for equitable and inclusive judicial administration in the contemporary 
world. marc Galanter has noted a similar phenomenon, but presented it in a 
much different light 89:
The search for justice is driven by the production of injustice. The discom-
forts and risks of everyday life have declined dramatically for most people over 
the past century [...]. Even so, we will not approach a problem-free world, for 
people are capable of identifying or inventing new problems as quickly as the old 
ones are solved. This is not a cynical observation about an insatiable appetite for 
a «risk free world». Rather, it is premised on the notion that the very same human 
capabilities that create solutions for existing problems [...] discover or create new 
needs, new wants, and new problems.
88 Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007: 124.
89 Galanter, 2010.
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perhaps pessimism (in either one of these two versions) is the best and most 
responsible attitude in commenting on the realizations of equal access to justice 
in the contemporary world: tragic choices among competing needs, desires and 
wants lurk behind almost any decision on when, how, by and for whom, access 
to justice should be expanded.
The need for tragic choices does not obliterate the duty to choose reasonably, 
however. This paper has reviewed few leading decisions by Supreme Courts on 
access to justice and argued that a CA provides sensible alternative strategies, 
that await for interdisciplinary development and political engagement.
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